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Commentary
PLURALISM, DISAGREEMENT, AND
GLOBALIZATION: A COMMENT ON
WEBBER'S "LEGAL PLURALISM AND
HUMAN AGENCY ' ©
BY DAVID SCHNEIDERMAN*
Legal pluralist scholarship, a body of literature to which Harry
Arthurs has made a singular contribution, aims to uncover instances of
norm generation beyond those usually associated with official law. State
law, legal pluralists maintain, is not the sole or most important site of
norm generation. Jeremy Webber's forceful, but friendly, critique' aims
to repair perceived flaws in the pluralist enterprise. He claims that legal
pluralists fail to attend to the element of normative disagreement within
their field of study. That is, in the course of documenting the parameters
of pluralist law-making communities and institutions, "legal pluralist
theories ... treat as matters of fact normative claims that are contested
within the very circumstances in which they are presumed to operate."2
There is, relatedly, prevalent confusion between descriptive and active
modes assessment-between describing normative parameters and
actively constructing them in the course of description. In blurring these
lines, legal pluralist scholarship, perhaps inadvertently, takes sides in
normative disputes within communities that might be understood as
more contingent than final. Webber aims to rehabilitate pluralist work
by pulling on four central pluralist themes that are worth holding on to.
These themes also make space for reconsideration of the normative
© 2006, D. Schneiderman.
Faculty of Law, University of Toronto and Visiting Sabbatical Scholar, Georgetown
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2 Ibid. at 169.
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importance of state law, which Webber views as emptied of significance
in pluralist work. By situating official law in the centre of the normative
universe, Webber maintains that the legal order's desire for certainty, at
least in the interim, is secured. The imperative of certainty demands that
disagreement, even within pluralist accounts, must give way to
agreement, at least until the next occasion for disagreement arises.
In the first part of this comment, I address the role of
disagreement, the blurring of normative and descriptive accounts, and
the ambivalent role of the state. I aim to bring into question Webber's
empirical assessments of pluralist scholarship. In the second part, I take
up the idea of "interim finality" despite the fact of disagreement within
and between plural legal orders. I argue that Webber is right to insist
upon interim finality, for both analytical and strategic reasons. By way of
illustration, I look to some of the rules and institutions we associate with
economic globalization, namely, international commercial and
investment arbitration. This also provides an opportunity to engage with
matters that have been of concern to Arthurs in his more recent work.
I. PLURALISM AND DISAGREEMENT
Webber has identified a central paradox for legal scholars doing
pluralist work: how to outline the parameters of non-state
jurisgenerative communities-the everyday work of legal pluralist
scholarship-without also marginalizing sub-communities with
alternative and contestable normative accounts; how, then, to avoid
displacing the legal pluralism that may be sidelined by legal pluralist
scholars?
This is a characteristic, undoubtedly, one finds in some legal
pluralist work. Webber, however, makes little mention of those scholars
guilty of the charge. Arthurs, whose career we honour in this volume, is
mentioned only in passing and seems an unlikely target for this purpose.
After all, one of the central objects in Arthurs' Without the Law3 is to
decentre the authority of official law in the face of an emergent
administrative legal order.4 This sort of enterprise is about identifying
- H.W. Arthurs, "Without the Law" Administrative Justice and Legal Pluralism in
Nineteenth-Century England(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1985).
" For a description of this sort of work, see Sally. Merry, " Legal Pluralism" (1988) 22 Law &
Soc'y Rev. 869 at 874.
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new forms of legal regulation emerging outside of courts and official
state law; it is not so much about cataloguing a detailed legal regime of
the workplace. We could say the same thing about Sally Falk Moore,
who is named in Webber's critique. Moore's field work with the Chagga
of Mount Kilimanjaro describes interactions between official state law
and local forms of social regulation. This sort of ethnographic work,
according to Webber, is unconcerned with the origins of norms-
"norms tend to be given-as much a matter of historical accident as of
anything else."5 In the course of describing local law, legal pluralists like
Moore take for granted the obligatory nature of norms without taking
account of the "often deep disagreement over matters of obligation."6
Moore and others thereby impose an "artificial commonality" over
matters that are "eminently contestable, obscuring and minimizing the
presence of dissent."7
These charges against Moore seem misdirected. In her book,
Law as Process,8 and her oft-cited paper, "Law and Social Change: The
Semi-Autonomous Social Field as an Appropriate Subject of Study,"9
Moore attends repeatedly to the phenomena of disagreement,
uncertainty, and indeterminacy. The Chagga work, which explores
relationships between official and unofficial legal fields, describes
"ongoing competitions, collaborations, and exchanges."10 There is no
presumed consensus, but multiple conceptions of norms that give rise to
a "symbolic consensus."'" Moore describes her methodology as resting
on the assumption that "in some underlying and basic sense social
reality is fluid and indeterminate, and that it is transformed into
something more fixed through regularizing processes, yet can never
entirely or completely lose all of its indeterminacy."12 Boaventura de
Sousa Santos' field work on Pasagarda law (mentioned in a footnote) is
also attentive to disagreement, even to silence as a "positive expression
5 Supranote 1 at 172.
6 Ibid. at 173.
7Ibid. at 174.
'Sally Falk Moore, Law as Process. An AnthropologicalApproach (Hamburg: LIT Verlag
& James Curry, 2000).
9(1973) 7 Law & Soc'y Rev. 719.
'oSupra note 8 at 80.
JIbid. at 210.
12 Ibid. at 52.
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of meaning."' 3 His careful analysis of dispute resolution in a Brazilian
favela attends precisely to the questions of power and dissensus that
animate Webber.
Moore and Santos accept that there is an artificial commonality
imposed on contestable legal orders. They well appreciate that the
antidote to the question posed by Webber is to act more like social
scientists. "It is because we are implicated in the world that there is
implicit content in what we think and say about it," 14 writes Pierre
Bourdieu. And so, membership in the social sciences requires
reflexivity-that 'researchers turn the methods of "knowledge onto
themselves"15 in order to detect self-interested social and economic
interests that are inscribed in orthodox methods of knowledge
production.
Even if legal pluralist orders are contestable creatures of
scholarly production, Webber insists that even these normative orders
strive for some certainty. In the face of complexity and disagreement,
any order of associates in law will aspire to smooth over disagreement
and maintain consensus and order until the next opportunity for norm
reconsideration arises. There has to be some form of interim finality,
understood as partial and contingent. Order is preserved to the extent
that dissenters have the opportunity to impose their will on the legal
order on some future date. Along these lines, political theorist Adam
Przerworski advocates a democratic regime of "rule open-endedness, or
organized uncertainty" where no one political force predetermines
political ou tcomes. 1  But even this model of political pluralist
contestation does not capture what Webber maintains normative legal
orders require in practice-what is at "the very heart of law"-a "single
normative position to govern relations within a given social milieu,
despite the continuing existence of normative disagreement."' 7
1 Boaventura de Sousa Santos, Toward a New Legal Common Sense: Law, Globalization,
and Emancipation, 2d ed. (London: Butterworths Lexis Nexis, 2002) at 109.
"4 Pierre Bourdieu, Pascalian Meditiations, trans. by Richard Nice (Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 1997) at 9.
' Loic Wacquant, "Pointers on Pierre Bourdieu and Democratic Politics" (2004) 11
Constellations 1 at 11.
16 Adam Przeworski, Democracy and the Market. Political and Economic Reforms in
Eastern Europe and Latin America (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991) at 13.
" Supra note 1 at 169.
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This seems to resemble more the legal positivist enterprise at the
heart of the "rule of law" than the project associated with legal pluralist
scholarship. Robert M. Cover, like the legal pluralists, describes as
"legal DNA" the "proliferation of legal meaning"; the multiplicity of
interpretive communities engaging in law making and interpreting is
inevitable for Cover and impossible to suppress.8 For this reason,
Webber's conception of law might be considered more decisionist than
pluralist. An insistence on partial and interim closure, however, is
congenial with the notion of "symbolic consensus" developed by Moore.
As reconcieved by pluralist thought, this calls for a "highly reflexive
conception of democracy"'19 where polities swing between the twin
exigencies of closure and openness. Alan Keenan, though not writing as
legal pluralist, best articulates the democratic conception of self-rule at
work here. Openness to the other through democratic deliberation, he
writes, paradoxically requires moments of closure, in which the polity
constitutes itself in order to carry on its deliberative project of self-
rule."0 Or, as Chantal Mouffe has put it, exclusivity is constitutive of
collective identity-in the constitution of "us," we almost always will
exclude "them."'" But acts of closure do not preclude a return to
openness to the other, to the transformative possibilities engendered by
encounters with those who are excluded, not accounted for, or otherwise
outside of our sphere of concern. Rather, a polity can re-engage with the
possibilities of inclusion and attend to the potential of collective self-
revisability.22
The advantage of insisting on this sort of interim finality,
Webber adds, is that it allows us to "gain a renewed appreciation for
formal institutions, including the institutions of the state."23 By taking
the likelihood of disagreement seriously, the state re-emerges as an
important structure for settling inter-normative disputes. There must be
some way to "overcome the radical pluralism of our normative
8 Robert M. Cover, "Foreword: Nomos and Narrative" in "The Supreme Court 1982
Term" (1983) 97 Harv. L. Rev. 4 at 46.
"Neil Walker, "The Idea of Constitutional Pluralism" (2002) 65 Mod. L. Rev. 317 at 336.
20 Alan Keenan, Democracy in Question: Democratic Openness in a Time of Political
Closure (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003) at 11.
2 See Chantal Mouffe, The Return of the Political(London: Verso, 1993) at 141.
22 See Keenan, supra note 20 at 11.
' Supra note 1 at 180.
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assertions"" and the institutions of the state aid in providing the
conditions in which normative disagreement may continue to carry on.
Some pluralist scholarship admittedly denigrates state law-
John Neville Figgis in the early twentieth25 and Leopold Pospisil in the
late twentieth century, 6 for instance. Yet much pluralist thinking has
accommodated itself to the fact of state law as an "inescapable
framework" for the practice of legal pluralism." Sally Merry observed
that research since the 1980s "has increasingly emphasized the dialectic,
mutually constitutive relation between state law and other normative
orders."' Indeed, this precisely is the finding of the ethnographic work
undertaken by Moore and Santos. Their interventions, despite Webber's
claim, do not mix normative with descriptive accounts, nor do they
normatively assess the value of state law in shaping plural legal orders.
Webber's conceptual reformulation, in which state law lies at the
centre, is reminiscent of Ernest Barker's intervention in the early
twentieth century.29 If Barker was sympathetic to the pluralist critique
articulated by Otto Gierke, Federic William Maitland, Harold Laski,
and Figgis,3 ° he also believed they went too far in displacing state law.
Like Webber, Barker viewed the state as unique in its law-making
capacity. This imposed certain obligations on the state whenever it acted
in ways that had an impact on associational life. The state had the
capacity to regulate associational life only, he wrote, "by rules designed
to secure the minimum of friction between its members and the
maximum of development."'" The state's steering capacity, then, played
a special role in regulating pluralist legal life which very much resembles
24 Ibid. at 182.
1 John Neville Figgis, Churches in the Modern State, 2d ed. (London: Longmans, Green
and Co., 1913).
2 6 Leopold Pospisil, "The Structure of Society and its Multiple Legal Systems" in Philip H.
Gulliver, ed., Cross-Examinations." Essays in Memory of Max Gluckman (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1978)
96.
2 7 Supra note 4 at 879.
28 Ibid. at 880.
29 On Barker's engagement with the pluralists, see David Runciman, Pluralism and the
Personality of the State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).
'I discuss this early legal pluralist movement in "Harold Laski, Viscount Haldane and the
Law of the Canadian Constitution in the Early Twentieth Century" (1998) 48 U.T.L.J. 521.
3' Ernest Barker, "Introduction" in Otto Gierke, Natural Law and Theory of Society 1500
to 1800, trans. by Ernest Barker (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1934) at lxx.
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the re-justification of the state, but "on more plural foundations," as
Webber urges in his article. This ongoing tension-whether to treat
state law as one among other plural legal orders or as distinctively
different-likely will remain unsettled within the normative stream of
legal pluralist scholarship.32  Its flourishing ethnographic stream,
however, will continue to catalogue the interplay within and between
legal orders.
II. DISAGREEMENT AND GLOBALIZATION
It is reasonable to assume, as Webber does, that disagreement is
endemic to jurisgenerative groupings. But not all plural legal orders are
as unstable as Webber suggests. The transition to what I call "interim
finality" is easier for some than for others. Even for those groups in
which disagreement is accommodated within the very structure of
decision making, as within idealized deliberative democracies, it still is
possible to locate dominant conceptions of rules that frame and
constrain decision making. Usually these will be determined by those
operating within elite circles, by the "organizers of society."33 Exercising
a form of cultural leadership, these elites usually can be relied upon to
articulate shared, but dominant, values and understandings. This
leadership will have been successful in representing society back to
itself-it will have gained legitimacy-only if it has, as Arthurs has
observed, generated its own "justificatory rhetoric, its own symbols and
myths."34 This will limit the range of possibilities within the universe of
policy options.
So while we should be attentive, as Webber reminds us, to the
sources of norm-generating consensus within particular communities-
3 See Emmanuel Melissaris, "The More the Merrier? A New Take on Legal Pluralism"
(2004) 13 Soc. & Legal Stud. 57; Anne Griffiths, "Legal Pluralism" in Reza Banakar & Max
Travers, eds., An Introduction to Law and Social Theory (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2002) 289 at
296-97; and Gordon R. Woodman, "Ideological Combat and Social Observation: Recent Debate
About Legal Pluralism" (1998) 42 J. Legal Pluralism 21.
-' Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, ed. and trans. by Q. Hoare &
G. Nowell Smith (New York: International, 1971) at 5.
-4 Harry Arthurs, "Notes" (Presented to the Colloquium on the Constitutionalization of
Labour Rights at the University of Cape Town, 23 February 2004) [unpublished] at 13.
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to those who presume to speak for those who cannot be heard35 (and so
have the sort of agency Webber describes)-we also should understand
that these dominant conceptions play key functional roles within society
and important analytical ones for researchers when it comes to
understanding individual and collective action. The field of international
commercial and investment arbitration might be understood in precisely
this way. The body of law called lex mercatoria or the law merchant-a
body of rules developed from within the field of commercial
arbitration-is a commonly-cited instance of legal pluralism in the
modern world. Arthurs devotes a chapter in Without the Law to this
legal system generated by businessmen to facilitate commercial
transactions. Gunther Teubner goes so far as to describe lex mercatoria
as a "strong candidate" for a non-state legal order that is virtually global
in scope. This global law is being developed by economic subsystems "in
relative insulation from politics," he writes, outside the usual sources for
legal development, namely, the institutions of the state.36 Its normative
content, for this reason in part, is "extremely indeterminate."37
Surely, there are many points of disagreement within the field of
international arbitration that render its rules contestable and unstable.38
The field is not entirely open to contestation from without, yet there
also are disagreements between international economic lawyers and,
say, environmentalists or trade unionists. There are countervailing
narratives about the implications of investment rules that are both
immanent and external critiques of the field, precisely the sort of
disagreement generated by Arthurs with the field of commercial
arbitration. In my own work, I have departed from standard accounts of
investment rules (rules found in the North American Free Trade
Agreement [NAFTA] and over 2,000 bilateral investment treaties) and the
implications of arbitral rulings like Metalclad, which concerned the
shutting down of a hazardous waste facility site in Guadalcazar,
s See Giyatri Chakravorty Spivak, "Can the Subaltern Speak?" in Cary Nelson &
Lawrence Grossberg, eds., Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture (Urbana: University of
Illinois Press, 1988) 271.
' Gunther Teubner, "'Global Bukowina': Legal Pluralism in the World Society" in
Gunther Teubner, ed., GlobalLaw Withouta State (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1997) 3 at 4-6.
37 Ibid. at 21.
38 Compare, for instance, Christoph H. Schreuer, The ICSID Convention: A Commentary
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001) with M. Sornarajah, The International Law on
Foreign Investment, 2d ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).
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Mexico.39 Compensation was required to be paid to investors under
NAFTA, the arbitration panel ruled, because the municipal government
took measures tantamount to expropriation. International economic
lawyers resist the characterization of the case as concerning the taking
of measures to protect the environment and the health of local
campesinos-a story I have told elsewhere.4" Relying upon the egregious
findings of an arbitration panel, they prefer to tell a story about
corruption, protectionism, and self-dealing. International economic
lawyers understand that there are high stakes involved in the
characterization of these investment disputes. They would prefer that
these sorts of contests be depoliticized and insulated from public
scrutiny41 and therefore characterize these disputes as being in the
nature of the private and the contractual. 42
Admitting to these and other types of disagreements, the logic of
international arbitration still admits to only a limited range of
acceptable answers to trade and investment law questions. There are, in
other words, dominant understandings within the field that are widely
shared and not much in dispute. For instance, it is the imperative of
international investment arbitration to tilt interpretation against state
intervention and in favour of removing impediments to the movement
of goods, persons, and services across national boundaries. 43 This
structural tilt reveals how, whatever disagreement within the field over
particular outcomes, international economic law makes material those
things we ordinarily associate with economic globalization.
There is a further advantage to be gained by aiming at this level
of consensus within a particular field associated with legal pluralism: it is
that the field, despite Teubner's claim, is deeply implicated with official
state law. This precisely is a point admitted in much other pluralist work,
39 Metalclad Corpoation v. United Mexican States (2000), ARB(AF)/97/1 (Ch. 11 Panel),
online: NAFTA Secretariat <http://www.nafta-sec-alena.org/DefaultSite/index-e.aspx>.
4 See David Schneiderman, "Property Rights and Regulatory Innovation: Comparing
Constitutional Cultures" (2006) 4 Int'l J. Const. L. 371 [forthcoming].
41 The argument for repoliticization is made in Peer Zumbansen, "Piercing the Legal Veil:
Commercial Arbitration and Transnational Law" (2002) 8 Eur. L.J. 400.
42 I discuss this disagreement further in "Constitution or Model Treaty?: Struggling Over
the Interpretive Authority of NAFTA" in Sujit Choudhry, ed., The Migration of Constitutional
Ideas (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) [forthcoming].
4 M. Sornarajah, The Settlement of Foreign Investment Disputes (The Hague: Kluwer
Law International, 2000).
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as mentioned above. This is not to say merely that states themselves
author the rules and disciplines of economic globalization." Rather, the
point is that the field, particularly as it concerns investment disciplines,
appropriates central tenets of official state law, including principles of
constitutional law. Consider the disciplines of non-discrimination or
property rights of the sort ordinarily found in national constitutional
systems-the sorts of things Upendra Baxi labels "market-friendly
human rights."45 This connection to state law is most clearly evident in
U.S. investment treaty practice which, since 2002, incorporates language
drawn directly from U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence (the Penn
Central case46) in determining whether there has been a compensable
taking of an investment interest.47 The point is that these rules come
from somewhere, not just from anywhere."
Not only does this purported field of legal pluralism appropriate
principles of official state law, it also seeks to supplant the official law of
other states. The investment rules regime seeks to commit states to a
narrow range of policy outcomes, narrower than those available under
ordinary politics operating under national legal systems. These
disciplines serve, as Arthurs and others have argued, constitution-like
functions.4" Moreover, as these disciplines are suitable for all states in
the contemporary world, international commercial law has pretensions
of universality. Which brings us back to the directive of Webber's paper:
that we be alive to false claims of universality; that claims to universality
4 See e.g. Leo Panitch, "Rethinking the Role of the State" in James Mittelman, ed.,
Globalizatio'. CriticalReflections, vol. 9 (Boulder: Lynne Reiner Publishers, 1996) 83.
4 Upendra Baxi, The Future of Human Rights (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2002)
at 144.
46 Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1977).
4 Language which the Government of Canada has embraced in almost identical terms.
48 See Peter Fitzpatrick, Modernism and the Grounds of Law (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2001) at 204, following Santos, supra note 13 at 210, who describes the new lex
mercatoria as a "globalized localism."
4 H.W. Arthurs, "The Administrative State Goes to Market: (and cries 'wee, wee, wee' all
the way home)" (2005) 55 U.T.L.J. 797; Harry W. Arthurs, "Governing the Canadian State: the
Constitution in an Era of Globalization, Neo-liberalism, Populism, Decentralization and Judicial
Activism" (2003) 13 Const. Forum 16; and H.W. Arthurs, "Globalization of the Mind: Canadian
Elites and the Restructuring of Legal Fields" (1997) 12 C.J.L.S. 219. For an analysis of the politics
around defining the constitutional, see Gavin W. Anderson, "Legal Pluralism and the Politics of
Constitutional Definition" in Constitutional Rights After Globalization (Oxford: Hart Publishing,
2005) 99.
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often represent dominant particularisms that also "repress," in
Bourdieu's words, "the conditions of access" that give rise to the
universal.5 ° Empirical work, Webber reminds us, must avoid
representations of particularistic values as universal truths and that
scholars be attentive to the fact that access to the "universal" is available
only to the privileged few.
' Supra note 14 at 65. See also Pierre Bourdieu, "The Scholastic. Point of View" in Pierre
Bourdieu, Practical Reason-. On a Theory of Action (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998) 127
at 135.
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